The State Sponsors of Terrorism List is less a strategic tool and more a political instrument.
As he left office, Joe Biden announced plans to remove Cuba from the list. However, Donald Trump swiftly reversed that decision upon returning to the presidency, ensuring Cuba remained designated.
Such policy swings have become common in Washington, even when they impact millions of lives. For national security professionals, this inconsistency highlights a larger issue: the list itself is flawed. If Trump is looking for government programs to eliminate, he might consider scrapping this one—a move that could even attract bipartisan support.
Ask counterterrorism experts about the list, and the consensus is clear: it lacks consistency. Some argue that certain countries don’t belong on it, while others insist that some deserving ones are missing. Nearly everyone agrees that political considerations, rather than objective legal analysis, dictate its composition.
“Unfortunately, state sponsor of terrorism decisions have always been highly politicized,” said Jason Blazakis, a former director of the State Department’s terrorism designations office. “There is a review process, but politics, foreign policy, and negotiations often overshadow actual acts of extremism.”
In theory, the list can serve as a diplomatic bargaining chip, isolating designated nations from global financial institutions fearful of U.S. sanctions. However, it can also frustrate American allies and complicate diplomatic and trade efforts aimed at reforming adversarial governments.
Many U.S. diplomats view the list not as a rigorous assessment but as a politically motivated tool riddled with contradictions. “It makes diplomacy harder,” said a former Biden administration counterterrorism official. “It undermines credibility in negotiations.” Given Trump’s return, now is an opportunity to rethink—or even eliminate—the list.
A more nuanced approach could involve introducing tiers, differentiating between varying levels of support for terrorism. This could be especially relevant as Trump considers designating drug cartels as terrorist organizations. If Mexico fails to curb cartel activity, should it be added to the list?
Another option is creating an independent body to assess designations, as suggested by former Rep. Tom Malinowski (D-N.J.), who noted that every recent administration has faced pressure to politicize the process.
Even without the list, the U.S. possesses numerous counterterrorism tools. Established through 1970s legislation, the current list includes Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba. It differs from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list, which targets groups rather than governments and is subject to more rigorous legal scrutiny and regular review.
The debate over the list resurfaces whenever a particular country’s status is questioned. Cuba, for instance, has been added and removed multiple times depending on the political priorities of each administration and Florida’s voting dynamics. While Cuba’s government is undeniably repressive and supportive of authoritarian regimes like Venezuela, there’s disagreement over whether its actions qualify as sponsoring terrorism.
Trump justified keeping Cuba on the list by citing its harboring of fugitives and its involvement in obstructing peace talks. However, many argue that Cuba does not belong in the same category as Iran, which has a long history of actively funding terrorist organizations.
Because the list is binary—either a country sponsors terrorism or it doesn’t—nuance is lost, leading to contradictions. Analyst Dan Byman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has proposed a tiered system, including a “passive sponsorship” category for governments that tolerate, rather than directly support, terrorism. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, for example, might have historically fit this category due to extremist funding flowing from their territories.
Yet Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have never been listed due to their strategic importance to the U.S. Meanwhile, lawmakers have pushed to add Russia, citing its invasion of Ukraine and global destabilization efforts. The Biden administration has resisted, arguing it would hinder diplomatic engagement, including nuclear negotiations.
Trump’s stance on Russia makes it unlikely he would support its designation, despite North Korea being relisted in 2017 based on similar allegations of foreign assassinations. If assassination campaigns justify inclusion, Russia would be an obvious candidate.
Sudan presents another case of contradictions. Listed for nearly 30 years, it was simultaneously praised as a counterterrorism partner. Trump removed Sudan in 2020 due to regime change, demonstrating how political shifts influence the list. A similar debate could emerge over Syria should Assad’s regime fall.
State Department lawyers insist the list is subject to legal review, but critics argue these reviews often serve to justify political decisions. There has been no serious congressional effort to overhaul the list, likely due to political risks. No one wants to be accused of defending North Korea.
Yet in a political climate where Trump is redefining concepts like free speech and terrorism, now may be the time for lawmakers to reconsider the list’s structure—or its existence altogether.
“It damages U.S. credibility when we call on other nations to combat terrorism while relying on outdated policies ourselves,” Blazakis said.
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